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he relatively young field of evaluation, 
which by one account began to 
crystallize and emerge as a distinct 
profession around 1973 (Stuffelbeam & 
Shinkfield, 2007), has already seen more 
than its share of growing pains. Most 
notable are the “Paradigm Wars,” a 
protracted and often contentious debate 
between quantitative and qualitative 
methodologists, which lasted from the late 
1970s through the 1980s.  
 The relative calm that followed in the 
1990s did not last long. Old wounds 
opened again in 2003 when the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Institute of 
Educational Sciences (IES) issued a notice 
of proposed priority that privileged 
experimental and some types of quasi-
experimental designs over other 
evaluation methods in education 
evaluation funding competitions.  
 In the opening chapter in Part I of 
What Counts as Credible Evidence in 
Applied Research and Evaluation 
Practice?, Stewart Donaldson recounts 
the response of the evaluation 
community. The leadership of the 
American Evaluation Association (AEA) 
in 2004 published a statement opposing 
the new policy. In turn, a group of senior 
evaluators distanced themselves from the 
official AEA statement by posting their 
own statement in support of privileging 
experimental designs as applicable, thus 
threatening to reignite the old 
methodological debate.  
 In August 2006, a group of recognized 
thought leaders in the field of evaluation 
assembled to share their perspectives on 
the question of “What Counts as Credible 
Evidence?” The goal of this symposium, as 
Donaldson states, was to attempt to build 
bridges so that leaders on both sides of 
the debate would “stay together in a 
united front against the social and human 
ills of the 21st century” (p. 12), under a 
“shared blueprint for an evidence-based 
global society” (p. 12) The discussions 
from that symposium are compiled in this 
book.  
T
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 In addition to Donaldson’s historical 
background of the debate on credible 
evidence, Part I of the book also includes a 
paradigm background by Christina 
Christie and Dreolin Fleischer. These 
authors define a paradigm as a theory of 
knowledge which consists of an ontology 
(nature of reality), an epistemology (what 
is knowable and who can know it), and a 
methodology (how one can obtain 
knowledge). They go on to assert that 
most evaluators align themselves to one of 
two paradigm camps: post-positivism and 
constructivism.  
 Ontologically, post-positivists believe 
in a single, objectively observable reality, 
although recognizing that it may not be 
understood it in its entirety. The 
constructivists believe that there are 
multiple, subjective realities that may 
change according to the knower. 
Epistemologically, the post-positivists 
believe that the knower is independent of 
that which he or she is trying to know, 
while the constructivists believe that the 
knower and the known are interrelated. 
Finally, methodologically, the post-
positivists have a strong preference for 
quantitative methods and deductive 
reasoning, while the constructivists more 
frequently use qualitative methods and 
inductive reasoning.  
 This paradigm background sets the 
stage for the rest of the book, which 
consists of several post-positivist 
contributors writing in support of 
discovering credible evidence via 
experimental methods, followed by 
several constructivist contributors writing 
in support of determining credible 
evidence via non-experimental methods. 
Christie and Fleischer briefly mention that 
the mixed-methods approach evolved to 
circumvent the methodology debate; 
although frequently in practice one of the 
two basic methodologies counts as 
credible evidence while the other plays a 
supporting role only, thus providing little 
resolution to the polarizing nature of the 
ongoing debate.  
 Part II consists of four post-positivist 
essays making the case for experimental 
approaches as the preferred route to 
credible evidence. Part III consists of five 
constructivist (or at least constructivist-
friendly) essays supporting the use of non-
experimental approaches to obtain 
credible evidence. We will integrate 
reviews of the essays from both 
perspectives here to illustrate the 
contrasting nature of the perspectives.  
 Gary Henry roars out of the gate on 
behalf of the post-positivist case for 
credible evidence by stating that high-
quality experimental evaluations are the 
only way to eliminate selection bias when 
assessing policy and program impact, 
period. Bias is a systematic difference 
between a parameter value and an 
obtained statistic that, as a first line of 
defense against evaluations of poor 
quality, the evaluator should confront, 
quantify, and when possible, reduce to 
practical insignificance. Modern 
democracies need credible assessments of 
the causal impacts of public policies and 
programs and RCTs are the most 
conclusive means to filter out bad ideas 
and are available for almost all situations.  
 Michael Scriven, though not exactly a 
constructivist, disagrees with Henry in his 
essay. His primary argument involves 
positing that methods other than the 
RCTs can provide evidence capable of 
meeting the “gold standard” of credible 
evidence. This is an argument that Scriven 
has made before.1 Scriven evinces a 
credible argument that is easily accessible 
                                                
1 Scriven has made this point in Hard Won 
Lessons in Program Evaluation (1993) as well as 
in Cook, Scriven, Coryn, and Evergreen (2010). 
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to those who are looking for ways in which 
to argue solid cases for their evaluations, 
but may be on a limited budget or lack the 
infrastructure needed to perform an RCT. 
 Leonard Bickman and Stephanie Reich 
tone down the case for RCTs a bit but they 
still toe the post-positivist line. They 
argue for an acute awareness of the 
numerous threats to validity in evaluation 
and of the high costs of making the wrong 
decision. They explain that while RCTs 
may not be perfect, they seem to address 
threats to validity more adequately than 
other methods (although Scriven makes 
the case that the General Elimination 
Method [GEM] is the actual mechanism 
by which we do this, not the RCT). Still, 
the authors caution that judging 
credibility necessitates more than simply 
considering design. It also necessitates 
information about the questions asked: 
who asked the question and gathered the 
evidence, what evidence was gathered, 
how was the evidence gathered and 
analyzed, and under what conditions was 
the evaluation undertaken.  
 Jennifer Greene agrees that it is not 
just about design and introduces the 
political influences surrounding evidence 
basis for evaluation. She begins by 
discussing the background of the fight for 
evidence-based social science, and 
subsequently provides a rebuke of the 
main arguments for current evidence-
based thinking by pointing to the role of 
politics in dictation of methodology. She 
goes on to explore human complexity as a 
major argument for changing the 
conversation about evidence. Carol Weiss 
sang a similar tune, and Lee Cronbach 
appears to agree through his analyses of 
complex interactions in determining 
program effects. (Shadish, Cook, & 
Leviton, 1991) 
 Russell Gersten and John Hitchcock 
would beg to differ on the role of politics 
in evaluation. In their essay, they 
champion a database created by the IES 
called the What Works Clearinghouse 
(WWC). Like the National Institutes of 
Health, the IES is an independent 
institution that is protected from direct 
political influence. They go on to explain 
the thinking behind the WWC, especially 
focusing on the value the project places on 
randomized designs. The WWC has two 
goals: to provide guidance for judging 
quality and effectiveness of an 
intervention and to provide guidance for 
designing intervention research. While 
the authors of this essay are not saying 
that program evaluation should use only 
RCTs or high-caliber quasi-experimental 
designs, they are saying there are not 
enough of these designs in current 
educational evaluation research and that 
the WWC can remedy that situation if 
properly used.  
 Sharon Rallis will not have any part of 
that argument. Her essay begins with a 
discussion of how an evaluation of a 
program using one specific outcome 
produced negative results, thus resulting 
in a loss of funding. She posits that this 
situation is representative of the 
shortcomings of the RCT in answering 
human questions. She also asserts that 
evaluation informs policy, not science, 
and therefore methods that only focus on 
narrowly defined indicators are not 
effective. Rallis’ main point becomes that 
credible evidence is that which speaks to 
wholesale truth and moral soundness 
(which she spends a great deal of time 
defining). This view is supportive to those 
who utilize participant-focused evaluation 
methods such as democratic deliberation 
and transformative research methods 
(Shadish, Cook, & Leviton, 1991). 
 George Julnes and Debra Rog take the 
first steps towards reconciliation between 
the methodology antagonists in their 
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essay. While not giving ground on the 
mostly post-positivist notion that there IS 
such a thing as a “best” methodology, 
these authors concede that actionable 
evidence is as important as credible 
evidence and provide a pragmatic 
framework for method choice to produce 
findings that in turn guide action. This 
framework posits four questions: (1) how 
are the methods to be related to the 
questions being asked, (2) what 
contextual factors condition the evidence 
needed to support causal conclusions, (3) 
how are we to judge the adequacy of 
methods for providing the needed 
evidence, and (4) when is it appropriate to 
use particular methods of causal analysis. 
The main point here is that method choice 
should be contextual, contingent, and 
political to produce both credible and 
actionable evidence.  
 Sandra Mathison is not taking the 
olive branch. She takes the contextual 
argument to breath-taking heights by 
describing the use of found, participant, 
and researcher derived images as credible 
evidence. Her reasoning involves the use 
of these images to elicit processes and 
gain information that is not readily 
available through other means of 
research. She bases her arguments on the 
statement that the credibility of evidence 
is dependent on the context of the 
research and the research design itself. 
This extends to support her broader view 
of what counts as credible evidence as 
well. However, some readers may not be 
satisfied with this argument if they are 
looking for more standardized approaches 
to gathering credible evidence. 
 Thomas Schwandt masks his ontology 
(boxers? briefs? we don’t know) and plays 
the consummate peacemaker by 
discussing the need to abandon old 
debates that have prevented the move to a 
more enlightened view of evidence in 
social science. His analysis is more 
philosophical than those of the other 
contributors, but is salient to the debate 
nonetheless in his assertion that “what 
counts as credible evidence is not the 
same as what counts for credible 
evaluation” (p. 209). This chapter 
provides the most comprehensive view of 
what counts as credible evidence. It is also 
the most egalitarian in its treatment of the 
various methods as being equal in their 
ability to answer research questions. 
 Jason’s wrap-up: The conclusion of 
this book seeks to resolve the debate over 
what counts as credible evidence by 
asserting that those who ask the questions 
and those who answer them really 
determine what counts as credible 
evidence. I believe this is a salient point 
that illuminates another point made 
elsewhere—reality is measurable but the 
interpretation of reality is constructed. 
This book finds the ultimate middle 
ground, and makes valuable prescriptions 
for the future practice of evaluation. 
 Jan’s wrap-up: This symposium/book 
had two primary goals: (1) to create 
bridges between the warring parties of 
methodology and (2) to create a blueprint 
for an evidence-based global society. I’m 
not so sure it met its first goal. It certainly 
does not create a consensus or a universal 
answer to what counts as credible 
evidence. However, it does keep the lines 
of communication open. So if by “bridge” 
we mean openness to discussion, then yes, 
that goal is met.  
 I feel more confident that the second 
goal is met because the dialogue captured 
by this book stays away from 
fundamentalist extremes and strives to 
reach a pragmatic middle ground where 
we can, even with our ontological 
persuasions, work together towards an 
evidence-based approach to making this 
world a better place in which to live. 
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